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Abstract  
The materialist-postmaterialist value dimension, understood as assigning priority to self-expression and 
quality of life as opposed to physical and economic security, has been one of the most important heuristic 
tools in the analysis of the changes of predominant values in cross-cultural and comparative studies in past 
decades. In recent elaboration of self-expression and emancipative values (in both cases, with 
postmaterialism as the most important component), postmaterialist values have been viewed as an essence 
of democratic political culture and a cultural precondition of effective democracy. This study was aimed at 
analysing the relation between postmaterialist values (understood as a political - thick culture variable), 
satisfaction with country’s democracy (institutional - thin culture variable) and support for democracy. The 
data from the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative samples in twenty 
East European countries on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents, were used. It is shown that 
postmaterialism is an important aspect of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe; in general, the most 
supportive of democracy are postmaterialists. On the other hand, there is a mixed pattern between the 
postmaterialist values and satisfaction with democracy – in some countries, citizens satisfied with democracy 
are more prone to choose postmaterialist items compared to the dissatisfied ones, while in some other 
countries the reverse is true. Both are, however, important predictors of the support for democracy as well as 
the country’s level of democracy development (measured by the EIU Democracy index). The relevance of 
postmaterialist values for the promotion of democratic political culture in Eastern Europe, possible alternative 
mechanisms of value change as well as the materialist-postmaterialist conception are discussed.    
  
Keywords: (post)materialist values, political culture, satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy, 
East European countries. 
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Introduction 
In the past several decades, (post)materialism has had a very important role in the political culture debates. 
In a number of studies, Ronald Inglehart (e.g. Inglehart, 1971; 1990; Inglehart&Abramson, 1999; 
Inglehart&Baker, 2000; Inglehart&Welzel, 2005; Welzel&Inglehart, 2005) has shown that postmaterialist 
values, understood as a dimension that describes prioritizing security/lower needs versus the higher order 
ones, are linked to various normative beliefs or politically relevant dispositions as well as macro-level 
measures – the numerous indices of country’s economic (e.g. GDP per capita) and political development 
measures (e.g. Freedom House scores). 
 More recently, self-expression values (Inglehart&Welzel, 2005), supposedly one of the two main 
dimensions of cultural variation, or emancipative values (Welzel, 2013; Welzel&Inglehart, 2009) have 
replaced the earlier focus on postmaterialist values only. However, postmaterialist values are integral and 
the most important part of these two syndromes. Self-expression values include postmaterialist values, 
trust in others, political activism (signing a petition), subjective well-being and tolerance of deviant 
behaviour (homosexuality) (Inglehart&Welzel, 2005). Similarly, emancipative values include gender equality 
(over patriarchy), tolerance (over conformity), autonomy (over authority) and postmaterialist values 
(Welzel&Inglehart, 2009). On the other hand, a parallel line of research (Inglehart&Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 
2006; Welzel&Inglehart, 2005) continued to treat postmaterialism as a separate measure but focusing only 
on the “specifically libertarian aspects of postmaterialism, disregarding its ecological and aesthetical 
components (which are less relevant for democracy)” (Welzel&Inglehart, 2005, p. 10).Whatever its form, 
postmaterialism seems to be a very important aspect of democratic political culture. 
 Based on numerous empirical evidence that indicates the low levels of postmaterialist (i.e. self-
expression/emancipative) values in Eastern, post-communist societies (Welzel&Inglehart, 2005; 
Inglehart&Baker, 2000; Inglehart&Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2006; 2013), as well as on the supposed dynamics 
of the postmaterialist value shift described in socialization and scarcity hypotheses (Inglehart, 1990; 
Inglehart&Welzel, 2005), there is an often heard argument on the lack of cultural preconditions for a 
functional democracy in Eastern Europe. Due to the absence of certain structural preconditions, a limited 
experience with democracy and a long period of authoritarian rule, the democratic regimes established in 
this part of Europe after the fall of communism supposedly laid on an incompatible political culture that 
lacks some of the main features of a democratic outlook. The democratic regimes established during the 
last decade of the past century in this part of Europe are mostly described as (only) formal democracies 
(Inglehart&Welzel, 2005) or non-democracy or hybrid regimes (Welzel, 2013). The main argument can 
shortly be summarized as following: “for some countries to consolidate their democracy, a major shift in 
political culture is required” (Klingemann, 2006, p. xi). Otherwise, democratization is nothing but mimicry 
and a reestablishment of some sort of aggressive dictatorship becomes a highly probable outcome (Jowitt, 
1996). The non-stated (or rarely explicit) assumption is that culture causes structure and not vice versa 
(e.g. Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart, 1988; 1990; Inglehart&Welzel, 2005), a view that some scholars describe as 
a thick culture conception (Mishler& Pollack, 2003).  
Comparisons between the East and West have often shown that citizens of Eastern Europe are 
characterized by lower levels of political tolerance (Gibson, 1998; 2002; Peffley&Rohrschneider, 2003) or 
political activism (Dekker et al., 2003); furthermore, they generally support democracy less intensely 
(Klingemann et al., 2006; Pavlović, 2007). If found, the support for democracy in Eastern Europe is usually 
treated as lip service to democracy, not value-driven or supported by a commitment to deeper democratic 
values and norms (Inglehart&Welzel, 2005; Welzel&Inglehart, 2009).  
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 However, the premises of the culturalist paradigm of political change and the (political) structure 
versus (political) culture debate have often been called into question. There is a large body of evidence 
suggesting that effective democracy can cause allegiance to it where previously absent. The evaluation of 
system performances, in economic and political terms, and the quality of citizens’ experience with the 
system shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic 
institutions and norms (Jackman& Miller, 1996; Mishler& Rose, 2002; Muller &Seligson, 1994). In a newly 
democratized society, citizens can and must learn to be “democrats” and that is only possible in the context 
of democratic civic culture and pluralism and through the experience with the democratic political process 
(Dalton 1994; Fleron, 1996; Niemi&Hepburn, 1995), which is a sort of a lifetime-learning model (Mishler& 
Pollack, 2003). Once established, it is highly probable that democratic institutions will produce democratic 
values (Fleron, 1996). Democratic political culture is hence rather the effect than the cause of democratic 
structure. In other words, political culture is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democratic 
governance, but economic and political performance is seen as crucial (Mishler& Pollack, 2003).  
There is a great deal of empirical evidence in line with this statement. Gibson (1996) showed that 
the support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine was “a mile wide and more than an inch deep” (p. 417), 
suggesting that this was not a mere case of lip service to democracy. Contrary to Inglehart’s (1990) 
assumption of unidirectional causation – civic culture affects democracy but not vice versa – some 
researchers have shown that democratization increased the importance of pro-democratic values 
(Schwartz&Sagie, 2000), as well as that most civic culture attitudes did not have any significant impact on 
change in democracy, while some of them were rather effects of democracy (Muller&Seligson, 1994). 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the levels of political tolerance (Duch&Gibson, 1992), trust in 
social and political institutions (Rose et al., 1997; Loewenberg, Mishler and Sanborn, 2010; Boda&Medve-
Balint, 2014) or support for marketization and democracy (Whitefield & Evans, 1999; Pavlović, 2013; 
2014a) in post-communist countries can be explained in rational choice terms, as the products of 
resocialization during the period of democratization, i.e. the effects of economic and political performance 
evaluations. Even more, the patterns of influence of relevant factors (such as age, education, income etc.) 
on support for democracy (Klingemann et al., 2006) or institutional trust (Loewenberg, Mishler and 
Sanborn, 2010; Boda&Medve-Balint, 2014) seem to be quite similar in Eastern/Central Europe and in the 
established Western democracies. Similarly (and of special relevance for the present study), some studies 
have shown a strong influence of the current economic context (such as inflation and unemployment rate at 
the time of survey) on the postmaterialist preference (Clarck&Dutt, 1991; Clarke et. al., 1997; Clarke et. al., 
1999; Duch&Taylor 1993; 1994; Pavlović, 2014b; 2015), which can hardly be explained in political 
culture/socialization terms. 
The evidence linking postmaterialism and support for democracy is in fact rarely given and, if so, 
the evidence that proves the importance of mass attitudes for democracy is mainly based on aggregate 
level measures and uses the described value syndromes (e.g. Inglehart&Welzel, 2005; Welzel&Inglehart, 
2005; 2009). The present study offers some additional insights into the political and pro-democratic 
character of postmaterialism. Numerous scholars argue of (post)materialism as a measure of political and 
liberal values, instead of an early instilled value preference. De Graf and Evans (1996), based on the data 
that show the strong influence of educational level on the postmaterialist value preferences, argued that the 
standard postmaterialist index does not measure postmaterialism, but values related to political liberalism. 
Another study showed that educational level had a greater impact on postmaterialist scores based on a 
standard four-item battery, than on the postmaterialist index constructed of other items without a political 
connotation (Warwick, 1998). In some studies, the cohort differences become smaller, even trivial once the 
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education is controlled for (Duch&Taylor, 1993; Warwick, 1998). This viewpoint argues that some items in 
the battery will be sooner accepted by those who, during their years of schooling (or through some other 
experiences like living in an urban dwelling), learned to appreciate the values they stand for (Duch&Taylor, 
1993; Pavlović, 2009; 2014b; 2015). 
 Furthermore, as previously stated, in some studies Inglehart and his associates have clearly 
treated postmaterialism as a measure of liberty aspirations and value-rooted pressure for the growth of 
freedom (e. g. Welzel, 2006; Welzel&Inglehart, 2005). Bearing in mind that the content of postmaterialist 
items (e.g. participation/voice of people) in standard (post)materialism four or twelve items battery 
(Inglehart, 1990) refers to democratic norms and values per se, it seems that this connotation of 
postmaterialism is unrighteously neglected and often overlooked.1 Since Inglehart’s model describes the 
postmaterialist value shift in terms of the socialization process and culture/value change, postmaterialism 
could be treated as a very important cultural variable in the classic (political) structure versus (political) 
culture debate and as a thick culture variable (Mishler& Pollack, 2003). 
Still, treating it as a mere political and pro-democratic orientation in the context of the supposed 
mechanism and determinants of change would be quite challenging for Inglehart’s assumptions. The 
model’s insistence on the substantial role of formative years and economic/physical security is easily 
transferable and applicable to the materialist pole of the dimension, i.e. the relation between economic 
welfare and the satisfaction of lower (material) needs. If postmaterialism is an expression of those features 
of human nature that value autonomy and freedom of choice, democracy being the structural parallel of 
those inner forces, is the support for democracy an unquestionable and inherent consequence or an 
expression of holding postmaterialist values (i.e. those norms and values embedded in democracy)? Is 
postmaterialism a standard or a criterion by which the democracy is measured and evaluated? Or could 
valuing postmaterialist goals be “learned” during positive experiences with the regime that acknowledges 
and cherish democracy, showing that it is something worth valuing? In other words, is postmaterialism a 
standard for or a consequence of the evaluation process – a thick or thin culture variable? Put more simply, 
does one value democracy because one is postmaterialist or one can become postmaterialist after 
acknowledging the personal or group benefits of democracy (in whatever terms)? The dynamic interplay 
between the support for democracy, the satisfaction with the performances of country’s democracy and 
postmaterialism could give us some insights and at least partial answers to these questions.   
 This bears special relevance in East European countries. Majority of those countries lack 
preconditions that are related to the postmaterialist shift in theory. Postmaterialism in Eastern Europe is in 
some sense not to be expected and where and when found has unclear and multiple sources (Pavlović, 
2014b; 2015). If a meaningful link between postmaterialism, satisfaction with democracy and support for 
democracy in East European countries is to be found, that would be another contribution to the view that 
the nature of some of the main political variables between the Eastern and Western Europe does not 
substantially differ. It would additionally prove that support for democracy is not, by definition, superficial or 
just a mere lip service to democracy.  
Furthermore, such evidence would shed a different light on postmaterialism, additionally proving its 
sensitiveness to the prevailing political context. As previously mentioned, numerous studies have shown a 
                                                     
1 It is interesting to note that in Inglehart’s theory the political connotation and the political culture context of postmaterialism is 
only related to a broader syndromes of attitudes, beliefs and values, postmaterialism being only a part of it (e.g. self-expression 
values). Before arguing of self-expression values, Inglehart himself (e.g. Inglehart, 1988; 1990) spoke of a syndrome of civic 
culture which included life-satisfaction, interpersonal trust and rejection of revolutionary change of society and excluded 
(post)materialism.  
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relative influence and importance of prevailing economic conditions, those aspects of the value dimension 
that are covered by materialist items. Similarly, postmaterialist pole items have a clear, usually understated 
and overlooked political connotation and even more neglected implications. Do the current political 
conditions influence the postmaterialist items selection? If one is more prone to value/choose “fighting 
rising prices” as an important social goal in a country with high or rising inflation rate, can similar analogy 
be applied to the other pole of the postmaterialist value dimension – is one more prone to value “protecting 
freedom of speech” in a country in which it is a poorly guaranteed democracy norm? Could a similar 
“deprivation logic” be applied? Does one value democratic norms or postmaterialist goals because they 
function well or because they should function better? Are postmaterialist oriented citizens prone to support 
democracy differently if we take into account their evaluation of democracy? Or, to use terminology 
suggested elsewhere (Rose&Mishler, 1994), are postmaterialists in Eastern Europe Leaders (those who 
favour pluralistic regime even before they experience it) or Laggards (hesitant in their commitment until the 
new democratic regime has shown what it is worth)? The answers to these questions can have additional 
relevance for the structure versus culture debates in political culture studies. 
  
Methodology 
Sample. The analysis was performed on nationally representative samples in twenty East European 
countries (N=30,393) from the fourth wave of EVS (EVS, 2011) (conducted from 2008 to 2010). The 
following countries were included in the analysis: Albania (N=1,534), Bosnia and Herzegovina (N=1,512), 
Bulgaria (N=1,500), Belarus (N=1,500), Croatia (N=1,525), Czech Republic (N=1,821), Estonia (N=1,518), 
Hungary (N=1,513), Latvia (N=1,506), Lithuania (N=1,500), Moldova (N=1,551), Montenegro (N=1,516), 
FYR Macedonia (N=1,500), Poland (N=1,510), Romania (N=1,489), Russian Federation (N=1,504), Serbia 
(N=1,512), Slovak Republic (N=1,509), Slovenia (N=1,366) and Ukraine (N=1,507).  
 
Variables and Measures. The following variables were used in the analysis: 
(Post)materialist values. The standard four-item index (Inglehart, 1971; 1990) was used as a measure of 
(post)materialist values. The respondents were asked to choose two out of four social goals towards which 
their country should strive in the following ten years: fighting rising prices, maintaining order (materialist 
values), giving people more say in important government decisions, protecting freedom of speech 
(postmaterialist values). The respondents who chose two materialist goals obtained the score of 1 
(materialist values); those who chose both postmaterialist goals obtained the score of 3 (postmaterialist 
values), while the respondents of mixed priorities obtained the score of 2 (mixed type). 
Satisfaction with democracy. Measured by one four-point scale item “On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in 
[COUNTRY]?”. The relevance of this variable stems from the fact that, as shown elsewhere (Linde& 
Ekman, 2003), this should not be treated as an indicator of the support for the principles of democracy but 
as an item that taps the level of support for the way democratic regime works in practice and it will be 
treated here as such; an important institutional (or a thin culture) variable and a very important predictor of 
support for democracy in some Eastern European countries as previously found (Pavlović, 2014a). 
Support for democracy. The autocracy-democracy scale, often used as a measure of general support for 
democracy in political culture studies (e.g., Klignemann et al., 2006; Pavlović, 2008; 2010), was used in the 
present study as well. The scale was constructed in the following way: the scores of two items measuring 
attitudes towards autocracy on a four-point scale (“Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections” and “Having the army rule”) are added and the sum is subtracted from the sum of 
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scores of two items measuring preference for democracy on a four-point scale (“Having a democratic 
political system” and “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than any other form of 
government”). Scale values range from -6 (autocracy) to +6 (democracy). 
Democracy level. Democracy index 20082 is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit that 
measures the state of democracy in 167 countries. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five 
different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties, and political culture (index range 0–10).3 This 
measure is used here as an indicator of a country’s democracy level (a macro-level variable in multilevel 
analysis). 
Bearing in mind all of the peculiarities of individual countries, country by country analysis on the 
individual level was performed firstly. In the analysis of the individual and country level predictors of the 
support for democracy, hierarchical linear modelling was applied, with the support for democracy as a 
dependent variable. Data were weighted by country weight variable available in the EVS dataset to adjust 
socio-structural characteristics in the sample (gender and age) to population parameters. 
 
Results 
There is a clear pattern in the relation between postmaterialist values and support for democracy. With rare 
exceptions, the most supportive of democracy are the postmaterialists; on the other hand, materialists 
show the weakest support for democracy. Among the observed East European countries (Figure 4-1), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Romania slightly deviate from this trend (absent or very minor 
differences in support for democracy between the three types). In general, more supportive of democracy 
are those citizens who highly value societal goals that capture its essence4. 
In Figure 1, another important piece of data can be observed – citizens in each value type and in 
each country are, on the average, on the positive pole of the autocracy-democracy scale, i.e. positively 
oriented towards democracy as an ideal5. 
On the other hand, the prevailing feeling towards democracy’s performances in Eastern Europe is 
negative (Figure 2). There is only one country in which the majority of citizens are satisfied with democracy 
(Belarus). In all other cases, dissatisfied citizens outnumber the satisfied (very often by a large margin). 
Furthermore, the more satisfied one is with country’s democracy, the more supportive one is of democracy 
as an ideal6. Since we saw that the acceptance of democracy in general is influenced by the respondent’s 
                                                     
2 Obtained from www.eiu.com (accessed 10/09/2014). 
3 In addition to a numeric score and country rankings, the index categorizes countries as one of four regime types: full 
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. In the 2008 report, regarding the countries included 
in the present study, the Czech Republic and Slovenia were classified as full democracies; Belarus as an authoritarian regime, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Russia as hybrid regimes; all other countries belonged to the group of flawed 
democracies. 
4 Correlation analysis has shown that there are no significant correlations between the postmaterialist value index and autocracy-
democracy index in Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Russia. In all other cases, the correlation coefficients are significant and 
positive, varying from r=.06 (Bosnia and Herzegovina) to r=.25 (Slovak Republic). 
5 Applying the typology offered by Klingemann (2006) that differentiates between “autocrats” (those who obtained scores from -6 
to -1 on the autocracy-democracy scale), “undecided citizens” (scale value 0), “democrats” (scale values 1-4) and “strong 
democrats” (scale values 5-6), the majority of citizens in each country would be classified as “democrats”. 
6 Only in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova there are no significant correlations between the level of satisfaction 
with democracy and autocracy-democracy index. Except for Belarus, where the negative correlation is registered (r=.-28, p<.01), 
in all other cases, more positive feelings towards country democracy bring about a more intense support for democracy in 
general (lowest r=.06, p<01 [Hungary], highest r=.24, p<.01 [Estonia]). 
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value preferences, the question occurs whether there is a meaningful link between the satisfaction with 
democracy and (post)materialist value preferences and what the consequences for allegiance to 
democracy in general are.  
 
  
  
 
Figure 1. 
Support for democracy by value type in East European 
countries 
Note: Bars present the mean on autocracy-democracy index 
for the respective value type. 
 
Figure 2. 
Satisfaction with country’s democracy in East European 
countries 
Note: The “satisfied” category includes those who are “very” or 
“fairly” satisfied; those “not very” or “not at all” satisfied are 
treated as a “dissatisfied” group. 
  
 
 
 One might also wonder whether the respondents who differently evaluate country’s democracy are 
prone to value the analogue societal goals in a different way. Do the respondents satisfied with democracy 
value postmaterialist goals more highly than their unsatisfied compatriots? If we compare the proportion of 
satisfied and dissatisfied citizens in each East European country in three value types, we can see a rather 
complex picture (Figure 3). The bars on the left side of the graph (negative values) imply that there are 
more dissatisfied than satisfied citizens classified in the respective value type; the bars on the right side of 
the graph show the opposite. The data for the postmaterialist type are of special relevance. 
 In eleven countries the citizens dissatisfied with democracy chose the postmaterialist goals more 
often than the citizens with positive feelings towards democracy’s performances. In the remaining nine 
countries the picture is quite the opposite – a more satisfied citizen is more prone to rank postmaterialist 
goals higher. In some cases, the differences are minor (or to be more precise – the influence of satisfaction 
with democracy is more prominent in the remaining two value types) and generally low (around 5% in the 
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absolute terms). Still, the postmaterialist value preference from the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” 
perspective could imply the different sources and dynamics of postmaterialism within each country or in a 
comparative perspective.  
The respondent who is satisfied with country’s democracy can express his/her appreciation for 
democratic norms by saying that the country should continue to strive towards democratic norms (i.e. 
postmaterialist goals) because they have some clear “benefits”; one can value something that one 
possesses but wants it more or unchanged (Rokeach, 1973).  
 
 
Figure 3. 
The differences in the proportion of (dis)satisfied citizens in three value types by country 
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On the other hand, one can value something that one has not yet fully achieved. The citizen who 
highly values democracy in general can be cynical and critical towards its quality in his/her own society but 
still think that there is no alternative (i.e. still be postmaterialist). A negative evaluation of democracy could 
be based on the abstract, yet unfulfilled level of democratic norms towards which, in respondent’s opinion, 
the society should strive. Deprivation logic is here fully applicable – one wants something that one does not 
have. In other words, the postmaterialist value preference can be either a consequence of the evaluation 
process or the source of such an evaluation. The two are strikingly different and, more importantly, hardly 
separable.  
The materialist value preferences can be interpreted in a similar vein. In Figure 3 we can see that 
the values shown for the materialist type are relatively higher compared to postmaterialist type, as well as 
that there are countries with prevailing unsatisfied or satisfied materialist type. A satisfied materialist may 
be a materialist because he/she assesses postmaterialist goals as fully or (sufficiently) accomplished in 
one’s society (which is the reason why he/she is satisfied) and evaluate materialist goals as more pressing 
and acute7.  
The evaluation of democracy in one’s country can, on the other hand, be equalled with the 
evaluation of overall government performances, among other things in economic sphere (which, in citizens’ 
mind, does not have to be or hardly is relatively unrelated to or separable from democracy as a political 
system). Some studies have shown that the citizens of East European countries accept the new political 
regime, but not the new economic regime (Rose&Mishler, 1994). Thus, by choosing materialist goals, one 
can simply want to state the reasons for his/her negative feelings towards country democracy – poor 
economic performances. 
 Finally, if we compare the support for democracy among the (dis)satisfied (post)materialists, 
several important pieces of information are revealed (Figure 4). In half the number of the observed 
countries, the most intense supporters of democracy are postmaterialists, no matter whether they are 
satisfied or dissatisfied. Furthermore, the two postmaterialist subtypes compared, the predominant pattern 
is that allegiance to democracy is more widespread among the satisfied than the dissatisfied. Here one 
might argue – laggards more than leaders (Rose&Mishler, 1994). 
 
 
                                                     
7 This bears special relevance if we have in mind that the EVS wave (2008-2010) used in this study was conducted on the eve of 
the worldwide economic crisis. 
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Figure 4. 
Support for democracy by satisfaction with democracy and value type in East European countries 
 
 
Similarly, the satisfied materialists, in general, show more support for democracy than the 
dissatisfied. Even more, in some countries (for example, Latvia or Lithuania) the satisfaction with 
democracy could be a more important determinant of the support for democracy than (post)materialism – 
satisfied citizens are more supportive of democracy than the dissatisfied; even a satisfied materialist is a 
stronger “democrat” than a dissatisfied postmaterialist. 
Finally, the results of the multilevel analysis (Table 1) offer additional insights. The estimation of 
random parameters has shown that 10.7% of the variation in support for democracy stems from the 
variation between countries. All other things equal postmaterialism as well as satisfaction with democracy 
are significant predictors of the support for democracy and can account for some within and between 
country variance. The inclusion of the country level predictor – democracy level – in the model additionally 
increases the percentage of the explained between country variance (to 33% of the explained variance; 
data not shown in Table 1) and it is one of the most important predictors of the support for democracy. The 
citizens of those East European countries with more developed and effective democratic regimes are more 
supportive of democracy in general. 
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Table 1. Multilevel model of support for democracy in Eastern Europe 
 Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
Estimates of fixed effects      
Intercept 
 
-.358 .061 20.019 -5.875 .000 
Individual level      
 Age .012 .006 22544.371 2.072 .038 
 Education .143 .006 22557.373 21.697 .000 
Satisfaction with democracy .077 .006 22560.999 -12.435 .000 
Postmaterialism 
 
.085 .006 22550.042 13.553 .000 
Country level      
Democracy level 
 
.142 .061 20.039 2.323 .031 
Cross-level interaction      
Satisfaction with democracy * Democracy 
 
-.072094 .006205 22560.596 -11.618 .000 
Random part      
Country mean (Ϭu) .769 .007    
Level-1 effect (Ϭe) 
 
.073 .023    
Model fit      
Chi square 58204.036     
AIC 58224.036     
ICC .108     
    Note: entries are standardized coefficients; Maximum likelihood estimates. 
 
Furthermore, significant coefficients for the interaction term (satisfaction with 
democracy*democracy level) suggest the more prominent effects of evaluation variable in the countries 
with a more developed democracy: the citizens more satisfied with democracy are more intense supporters 
of democracy in a situation when democracy is more effective.  
 
 
Conclusions 
The presented data have several important implications. First of all, it seems that (post)materialism is 
undoubtedly an important aspect of the democratic political culture in Eastern Europe. No matter how 
poorly widespread postmaterialism in East European countries is, postmaterialists are exactly those who 
are the most intense supporters of democracy as an ideal. They are the safeguards of the idea of 
democracy and its windshields. If we view the concept of postmaterialism in the light of the original model 
(Inglehart, 1990), we might say that the support for democracy in Eastern Europe is far from being a mere 
lip service to democracy. At least to a limited extent it has cultural and thick culture roots. Furthermore, the 
lowest support for democracy in Eastern Europe compared to Western societies (Klingemann et al., 2006) 
can (partially) be explained by low levels of postmaterialism. But it seems that there’s more to it and this is 
only one possibility.  
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As found elsewhere (Clarck&Dutt, 1991; Clarke et. al., 1997; Clarke et. al., 1999; Duch&Taylor 
1993; 1994; Pavlović, 2014b; 2015), the items rankings in postmaterialism battery are highly sensitive to 
current economic conditions and individual evaluations. The data shown in this paper additionally indicate 
the importance of current political conditions and evaluations. It seems that postmaterialism may not be a 
criterion for political evaluations but its consequence instead. If it really is an early socialization product, a 
matter of thick culture – essential, fundamental, coherent, durable (Mishler& Pollack, 2003) – then we 
would not expect it to be under the influence of prevailing conditions. A postmaterialist should support 
democracy despite the quality of his/her evaluation of its functioning. However, as indicated on previous 
pages, the network between postmaterialism, satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy is 
rather complex. Furthermore, postmaterialism in some cases may be nothing but a tally or a summary of 
political and economic evaluations, the product of a lifetime experience. To use this terminology once more, 
a thin culture variable, which is rationally based, reciprocally related to political institutions, dynamic 
(Mishler& Pollack, 2003). Postmaterialism may not be an expression of the main ungratified personal 
needs, rooted in individual history (as the original model proposes), but a consequence or a summary of 
evaluations of how well the country has dealt with some important issues (economic and political). Or it 
may be “thicker” than mere evaluations (e.g. value orientation), a base for such evaluations or a looking 
glass for prevailing societal issues, but not early instilled and with no reference to more recent experiences.    
If we have in mind that the support for democracy is influenced by the quality of country’s 
democracy, it may be hypothesized that postmaterialism can be “created” by creating a more functional 
democracy. One way of making people more satisfied with democracy is through more positive outcomes 
of democracy itself, securing the benefits for the many. If democracy fulfilled the great expectations of East 
Europeans, they would become more satisfied with it and more prone to recognize and acknowledge the 
importance and value of having and living under the democratic regime, thus becoming more prone to 
value the postmaterialist liberty items, which would in turn further strengthen the democracy. It would be a 
sort of a “thin-to-thick” direction of the political culture change. There are studies that proved that the 
downward causation (macro-to-micro level) works quite well: thin aspects of political culture related to 
macro-level phenomena induce a change in the thick aspect of political culture (for example, individual 
value preferences), which results in further changes in responses to macro political conditions (Voinea, 
2014, see also Voinea, 2013). Data presented here can be seen in this light and deserve further 
investigation. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper is a part of the project “Social Transformations in the European Integration Process: A Multidisciplinary Approach” 
(No. 47010), which is funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. 
 
 
References 
Boda, Z. & G. Medve-Balint (2014). Does institutional trust in East Central Europe differ from Western Europe? European 
Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 3 (2), 1-17. 
Clarke, H. D. & N. Dutt (1991).Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment. 
American Political Science Review, 85, 905-920. 
Clarke, H. D., N. Dutt and J. Rapkin (1997). Conversation in Context: The (Mis)measurement of Value Change in Advanced 
Industrial Societies. Political Behaviour, 19, 19-39. 
Clarke, H., A. Kornberg, C. McIntyre, P. Bauer-Kaaseand M. Kaase (1999). The Effect of Economic Priorities on the 
Measurement of Value Change: New Experimental Evidence. American Political Science Review, 93, 637-647. 
  
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM  
Volume 5, No.3, July 2016 
                  ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                  ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 53 
Dalton, R. (1994). Communist and democrats: Democratic attitudes in the two Germanies. British Journal of Political Science, 24, 
469-493. 
De Graaf, N. D. & Evans, G. (1996). Why are the young more postmaterialist? A cross-national analysis of individual and 
contextual influences on postmaterial values. Comparative Political Studies, 28, 608-635. 
Dekker, P., P. Ester and H. Vinken (2003). Civil Society, Social Trust, and Democratic Involvement, in   W. Arts, L. Halman and 
J. Hagenaars (eds.): The Cultural Diversity of European Unity (217-254). Leiden-Boston: Brill. 
Duch, R. M. & M. A. Taylor (1993). Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition, American Journal of Political Science, 37, 747-
779. 
EVS (2011). European Values Study 1981-2008, Longitudinal Data File. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA4804 Data File 
Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11005. 
Fleron, F. (1996). Post-soviet political culture in Russia: An assessment of recent empirical investigation. Europe-Asia Studies, 
48, 225-260. 
Gibson, J. (1996). A mile wide but an inch deep(?): The structure of democratic commitments in the former USSR. American 
Journal of Political Science, 40 (2), 396-420. 
Gibson, J. (1998). Putting up with fellow Russians: An analysis of political tolerance in the fledging Russian democracy. Political 
Research Quarterly, 51, 37-68. 
Gibson, J. (2002). Becoming tolerant? Short-term changes in Russian political culture. British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2), 
309-333. 
Inglehart, R. & Abramson, P. (1999).Measuring postmaterialism. American Political Science Review, 93, 665 -677. 
Inglehart, R. & C. Welzel (2005). Modernization, culture change, and democracy – the human development sequence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Inglehart, R. & W. E. Baker (2000). Modernization, culture change and the persistence of traditional values. American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 65, pp. 19-51. 
Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. American Political 
Science Review, 65, 991-1017. 
Inglehart, R. (1988). The Renaissance of political culture. American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, pp. 1203-1230. 
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Jackman, R. & Miller, R. (1996).A renaissance of political culture. American Journal of Political Science, 40 (3), 632-659. 
Jowitt., K. (1996). Dizzy with democracy. Problems of Post-communism, 43, 3-8. 
Linde, J. & J. Ekman (2003). Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. 
European Journal of Political Research, 42, 391-408. 
Loewenberg, G., Mishler, W. and H. Sanborn (2010).Developing attachments to new political institutions: A multi-level model of 
attitude formation in post-Communist Europe. European Political Science Review, 2, 475-494. 
Mishler, W. & Pollack, D. (2003). On culture, thick and thin: Toward a neo-cultural synthesis. In D. Pollack, J. Jacobs, O. Muller 
and G. Pickel (eds.), Political culture in post-Communist Europe: Attitudes in new democracies (pp. 237-256). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (2002). Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes. European 
Journal of Political Research, 41 (1), 5-36. 
Muller, E. M. &Seligson, M. A. (1994). Civic culture and democracy: The question of causal relationships. American Political 
Science Review, 88 (3), 635-652. 
Niemi, R. G. & Hepburn, M. A. (1995).The rebirth of political socialization. Perspectives on Political Science, 24 (1), 7-16 
Pavlović, Z. (2007). Svetsko javno mnjenje o demokratiji – da li je demokratija univerzalno poželjan oblik vladavine. U D. Pantić i 
Z. Pavlović, Javno mnjenje - koncept i komparativna istraživanja (pp. 109-134). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka i 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Pavlović, Z. (2008). Demokratska politička kultura u Srbiji pre i posle demokratskih promena. Nova srpska politička misao, 16, 
157-176. 
Pavlović, Z. (2009). Is there a sociodemographic model of acceptance of postmaterialist values? The case of Serbia. 
Sociologija,51, 177-188. 
Pavlović, Z. (2010). Prihvatanje demokratije i demokratske orijentacije u Srbiji u kontekstu društvenih promena. Psihološka 
istraživanja, 13, 35-58. 
Pavlović, Z. (2013). Political culture v. rational choice: support for democracy in Serbia. In Florela Voinea, C., Todosijevic, B. and 
Boella, G. (eds.), Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies (pp. 137-154). Bucuresti: Ars Docendi. 
  
 
 
 
  
Zoran Pavlovic: (Post)Materialsim, Satisfaction with Democracy and Support for Democracy in Eastern Europe 
 
EQPAM Volume 5 No.3 July 2016  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916   
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 54 
Pavlović, Z. (2014a). Intrinsic or instrumental support for democracy in a post -communist society. The case of 
Serbia. European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 3(1), 31-42. 
Pavlović, Z. (2014b). Postmaterialist values in East Europe. Paper presented at European Conference on 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities ECPAM 2014 “Eastern European Post-Communist Society: A Look from 
Inside to the Eastern European Political Culture Before and After the Fall of Berlin Wall” (6-8 th November). 
Bucharest: Faculty of Political Science University of Bucharest.  
Pavlović, Z. (2015). Individual and country level determinants of (post)materialist values in Eastern Europe. European Quarterly 
of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 4(2) (in press). 
Peffley, M. & Rohrschneider, R. (2003). Democratization and political tolerance in seventeen countries: A multi-level model for 
democratic learning. Political Research Quarterly, 56, 243-257. 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: The Free Press. 
Rose, R. & W. Mishler (1994). Mass reaction to regime change in Eastern Europe: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards? British 
Journal of Political Science, 24, 159-182. 
Rose, R., Mishler, W. and Haerpfer, C. (1997). Social capital in civic and stressful society. Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 32, 85-111. 
Schwartz, S. H. & Sagie, S. (2000). Values consensus and importance: A cross-national study. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 31 (4), 465-497. 
Voinea, C. F. (2013). Why Individual Interactions Are Not Enough? Agent-Based Simulation of Polity. An Operational Concept. In 
F. C. Voinea, B. Todosijevic and G. Boella (eds.), Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies (pp. 77-122). 
Bucuresti: Ars Docendi. 
Voinea, C. F. (2014). On Mechanism, process and polity: An agent-based modeling and simulation approach. European 
Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 3 (3), 15-45. 
Warwick, P. V. (1998). Disputed Cause, Disputed Effect – The Postmaterialist Thesis Re-Examined. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
62, 583-609.  
Welzel, C. & R. Inglehart (2005). Democratization as the growth of Freedom: The human development perspective, Japanese 
Journal of Political Science, 6(3), 1-31. 
Welzel, C. (2006). Democratization as an emancipative process: The neglected role of mass motivations. European Journal of 
Political Research, 45, 871-896. 
Welzel, C. (2013). Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Welzel, C. & R.Inglehart (2009). Political culture, mass beliefs and value change. In C.Haerpfer, P.Bernhagen, R.Inglehart, and 
C.Welzel (eds.), Democratization (pp. 126-144). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Whitefield, S. and G. Evans (1999).Political culture versus rational choice: explaining responses to transition in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. British Journal of Political Science, 29 (01), 129-154. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities EQPAM  
Volume 5, No.3, July 2016 
                  ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                  ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 55 
 
 
 
 
 
Open Access 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any 
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 
